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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
To protect the public, a sentencing judge may restrict a con-
victed defendant’s use of computers and the internet. But to 
respect the defendant’s constitutional liberties, the judge must 
tailor those restrictions to the danger posed by the defendant. 
A complete ban on computer and internet use “will rarely be 
sufficiently tailored.” United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 
197 (3d Cir. 2011). This case illustrates why. 
Branden Holena was convicted of using the internet to try 
to entice a child into having sex. As a condition of his super-
vised release from prison, he may not possess or use computers 
or other electronic communication devices. Nor may he use the 
internet without his probation officer’s approval. Restricting 
his internet access is necessary to protect the public. But these 
restrictions are not tailored to the danger he poses. So we will 
vacate and remand for resentencing. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Holena repeatedly visited an online chatroom and tried to 
entice a fourteen-year-old boy to have sex. He made plans to 
meet the boy. He assured the boy that his age was not a prob-
lem, as long as the boy did not tell the police. But the “boy” 
was an FBI agent. So when Holena arrived at the arranged 
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meeting spot in a park, he was arrested and charged with at-
tempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual acts. 
Holena pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to ten years’ im-
prisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. As a special 
condition of that supervised release, he was forbidden to use 
the internet without his probation officer’s approval. He had to 
submit to regular searches of his computer and home. And he 
had to let the probation office install monitoring and filtering 
software on his computer. 
After serving his prison sentence, Holena violated the terms 
of his supervised release—twice. The first time, he went online 
to update social-media profiles and answer emails. The second 
time, he logged into Facebook without approval, then lied 
about it to his probation officer. After each violation, the court 
sentenced him to nine more months’ imprisonment and reim-
posed the special conditions. 
At Holena’s latest revocation hearing, the judge imposed 
another condition, forbidding him to possess or use any com-
puters, electronic communications devices, or electronic stor-
age devices. Holena objected to this lifetime ban. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 
and 3583(e). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
We review revocation of supervised release for abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Bagdy, 764 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 
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2014). We insist on “some evidence” that the special condi-
tions imposed are “tangibly related” to the goals of supervised 
release. United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 
2007); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). To justify special conditions, 
district courts must find supporting facts. United States v. 
Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2009). We may affirm 
if we can “ascertain any viable basis” in the record for the re-
striction. Id. (quoting Voelker, 489 F.3d at 144). Here, we can-
not. 
III. THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
TAILORED 
Holena argues that the bans on computer and internet use 
are both contradictory and more restrictive than necessary. We 
agree. And we note that the lack of tailoring raises First 
Amendment concerns. 
A. The conditions are contradictory 
Holena’s conditions of supervised release contradict one 
another, so we cannot be sure that they fit the goals of super-
vised release. We cannot tell what they forbid, nor can Holena. 
So we must vacate and remand. 
One condition forbids Holena to “possess and/or use com-
puters . . . or other electronic communications or data storage 
devices or media.” App. 8 (¶ 11). But the very next condition 
provides that he “must not access the Internet except for rea-
sons approved in advance by the probation officer.” Id. (¶ 12). 
These requirements conflict. How can he use the internet at all 
if he may neither possess nor use a computer or electronic com-
munication device?  
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Two other conditions likewise conflict with the ban. One 
requires him to have monitoring software installed “on any 
computer” he uses. Id. (¶ 7). The other requires him to submit 
to searches of his computers. These conditions are difficult to 
reconcile given his computer ban.  
Nothing in the record helps us or Holena to harmonize these 
contradictory conditions. Even the Government “hesitates to 
discern” what the District Court meant to forbid. Appellee’s 
Br. 28. And the Government admits that the ban conflicts with 
several other conditions. 
Even so, the Government urges us to read the probation-
officer-approval provision as an exception to the ban. But we 
are not interpreting a statute. Due process requires district 
courts to give defendants fair warning by crafting conditions 
that are understandable. See United States v. Fontaine, 697 
F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2012). 
Holena cannot follow these conditions because he cannot 
tell what they forbid. So we will vacate and remand. 
B. The conditions are more restrictive than necessary 
Section 3583(a) places “real restriction[s] on the district 
court’s freedom to impose conditions on supervised release.” 
United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2005). Spe-
cial conditions may not deprive the defendant of more liberty 
“than is reasonably necessary” to deter crime, protect the pub-
lic, and rehabilitate the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); see 
id. § 3553(a). The same is true when district courts alter condi-
tions of supervised release. Id. § 3583(e)(2). 
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The scope and intrusiveness of Holena’s conditions, on this 
sparse record, violate this requirement. So, on remand, the Dis-
trict Court must tailor any restrictions it imposes to Holena’s 
conduct and history. Id. § 3583(d)(2), (e)(2); see also Voelker, 
489 F.3d at 146. Our remand is not “limited” to clarifying the 
special conditions. Appellee’s Br. 29. The District Court 
should conduct another revocation hearing. At that hearing, it 
should make findings to support any restrictions it chooses to 
impose on Holena’s internet and computer use. And it should 
ensure that Holena understands those restrictions. 
A defendant’s conduct should inform the tailoring of his 
conditions. For instance, a tax fraudster may be forbidden to 
open new lines of credit without approval. United States v. 
Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2016). A child molester 
may be forbidden to linger near places where children congre-
gate. United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir. 2012). 
And a child-pornography collector may be forbidden to pos-
sess pornography or visit pornographic websites. See United 
States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003). So inter-
net bans and restrictions have a role in protecting the public 
from sexual predators. 
Still, internet bans are “draconian,” and we have said as 
much “even in cases where we have upheld them.” United 
States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 408 (3d Cir. 2010). To gauge 
whether an internet or computer restriction is more restrictive 
than necessary, we consider three factors: the restriction’s 
length, its coverage, and “the defendant’s underlying conduct.” 
Id. at 405 (emphasis removed). Sometimes we also consider a 
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fourth factor: the proportion of the supervised-release re-
striction to the total restriction period (including prison). Al-
bertson, 645 F.3d at 198. But we cannot rely on that proportion 
because the numerator is a lifetime ban. So we give the fourth 
factor no weight here. 
Our analysis must be fact-specific. Id. We do not simply 
tally the factors, nor does one factor predominate. Here, both 
the length and coverage of the computer ban and internet re-
striction are excessive. And they are not tailored to Holena’s 
conduct. 
1. Length. We are troubled that Holena’s “restrictions will 
last as long as he does.” Voelker, 489 F.3d at 146. Without a 
more detailed record, we cannot uphold such a “lifetime cyber-
netic banishment.” Id. at 148. 
We have never upheld a lifetime ban in a precedential opin-
ion. And we have had trouble “imagin[ing] how [a defendant] 
could function in modern society given [a] lifetime ban” on 
computer use. Id. But we do not suggest that a lifetime ban 
could never be sufficiently tailored. And the Sentencing Guide-
lines recommend the statutory maximum term (which may be 
a lifetime term) of supervised release for sex crimes. U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.2(b)(2) (U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n 2016) (policy statement). 
Still, we are “conscious” that “[t]he forces and directions of 
the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching” that 
any restrictions imposed today “might be obsolete tomorrow.” 
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017). 
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So the lifetime duration of the blanket ban is presumptively ex-
cessive. 
2. Scope. The computer and internet bans both sweep too 
broadly. They are the “antithesis of [the] ‘narrowly tailored’ 
sanction[s]” we require. Voelker, 489 F.3d at 145. 
The ban on using a computer “or other electronic commu-
nications . . . device[ ]” is particularly draconian. App. 8 (¶ 11). 
In Thielemann, we upheld a qualified ten-year ban, one of the 
longest and most restrictive bans we have upheld yet. 575 F.3d 
at 278. But that ban involved some tailoring; the defendant 
could still “own or use a personal computer as long as it is not 
connected to the internet.” Id. (emphasis removed).  
Not so here. Even under the Government’s less restrictive 
reading, Holena can use no computer without his probation of-
ficer’s approval, nor even a cellphone. These restrictions apply 
even to devices that are not connected to the internet. These 
limitations prevent him from doing everyday tasks, like pre-
paring a résumé or calling a friend for a ride. None of these 
activities puts the public at risk. So the computer and commu-
nication-devices ban is too broad. 
The internet ban fares little better. It prevents Holena from 
accessing anything on the internet—even websites that are un-
related to his crime. True, the District Court did some limited 
tailoring of this restriction (if one reads the contradictory con-
ditions as adding up to less than a blanket ban). It imposed a 
monitoring requirement and let him use the internet with his 
probation officer’s prior approval. Those tweaks move the in-
ternet ban closer to the “comprehensive, reasonably tailored 
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scheme” that we require. United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 
188 (3d Cir. 2010). 
But the District Court gave the probation office no guidance 
on the sorts of internet use that it should approve. The goal of 
restricting Holena’s internet use is to keep him from preying 
on children. The District Court must tailor its restriction to that 
end.  
On this record, we see no justification for stopping Holena 
from accessing websites where he will probably never encoun-
ter a child, like Google Maps or Amazon. The same is true for 
websites where he cannot interact with others or view explicit 
materials, like Dictionary.com or this Court’s website. The 
District Court need not list all the websites that Holena may 
visit. It would be enough to give the probation office some cat-
egories of websites or a guiding principle.  
None of this is to say that the District Court may not impose 
sweeping restrictions. In appropriate cases, it may. We hold 
only that, on this record, the scope of the restrictions is too 
broad. 
3. Conduct. Holena used the internet to solicit sex from a 
minor. And he repeatedly violated the terms of his supervised 
release. That conduct warrants special conditions to limit his 
internet use. But we examine whether the District Court has 
tailored the special conditions to protect the public from similar 
crimes that Holena might commit. That tailoring is inadequate 
here. 
We recognize that the need to protect the public is strongest 
in cases like this, when the defendant used the internet to try to 
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molest children. See Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 278; United 
States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999). Holena’s 
conduct underscores that point. He solicited sex from a (sup-
posedly) fourteen-year-old boy. He graphically described the 
sexual acts he wanted to perform. And he knew what he was 
doing was wrong, but did it anyway. So there is still a strong 
need to protect the public. That is particularly true because the 
internet provides almost limitless opportunities to interact with 
people anonymously and nearly untraceably. 
Even so, Holena’s bans are not tailored to his conduct. They 
apply broadly to many internet and computer uses that have 
nothing to do with preying on children. 
On remand, the District Court must sculpt Holena’s re-
strictions to his conduct. Any restrictions it imposes must aim 
to deter future crimes, protect the public, or rehabilitate 
Holena. And the District Court must find facts so that we can 
review whether the restrictions are informed by Holena’s con-
duct and directed toward those goals. 
It is almost certainly appropriate to prevent Holena from 
using social media, chat rooms, peer-to-peer file-sharing ser-
vices, and any site where he could interact with a child. On the 
other hand, it may not be appropriate to restrict his access to 
websites where he is unlikely to encounter a child. And there 
are difficult cases in between, like restricting email access. We 
leave it to the District Court to make those close calls based on 
the record.  
But, on this record, the court may not prevent Holena from 
doing everyday tasks that have migrated to the internet, like 
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shopping, or searching for jobs or housing. The same is true for 
his use of websites conveying essential information, like news, 
maps, traffic, or weather. Nor does this record justify banning 
benign use of a computer without internet access. Absent spe-
cific factual findings, we cannot say that forbidding Holena to 
write a novel or listen to music on his computer makes the pub-
lic any safer. 
In crafting Holena’s restrictions, the District Court should 
also consider the availability and efficacy of filtering and mon-
itoring software. See Voelker, 489 F.3d at 150; United States v. 
Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding a 
complete internet ban because the defendant could disable 
monitoring software). Special conditions should involve “no 
greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” for 
its ends. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). So if software or another 
measure (like limiting Holena’s computer or internet use to the 
confines of the probation office) can achieve the goals of su-
pervised release, then that is preferable to an outright ban. In 
any event, the court must create enough of a record to ground 
its findings and enable our review. 
On remand, the District Court should also consider whether 
Holena may be allowed a cellphone. It should consider whether 
he can safely be allowed a smartphone with monitoring soft-
ware installed. Alternatively, it may wish to permit a non-in-
ternet-connected phone, perhaps with text messaging that is 
monitored or disabled. Along the same lines, many other de-
vices are connected to the internet, ranging from gaming de-
vices to fitness trackers to smart watches. We leave all such 
determinations to the District Court. 
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C. The conditions raise First Amendment concerns 
Section 3583’s tailoring requirement reflects constitutional 
concerns. Conditions of supervised release may not restrict 
more liberty than reasonably necessary, including constitu-
tional liberty. So district courts must “consider the First 
Amendment implications” of their conditions of supervised re-
lease. Voelker, 489 F.3d at 150. Conditions that restrict “fun-
damental rights must be ‘narrowly tailored and . . . directly re-
lated to deterring [the defendant] and protecting the public.’ ” 
United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128). And a condition is “not ‘narrowly 
tailored’ if it restricts First Amendment freedoms without any 
resulting benefit to public safety.” Id. at 266. 
Here, both Holena’s computer ban and internet ban limit an 
array of First Amendment activity. And none of that activity is 
related to his crime. Thus, many of the restrictions on his 
speech are not making the public safer. 
The Supreme Court recently struck down a North Carolina 
law banning sex offenders from using social-media websites. 
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. Because the parties did not 
mention Packingham in their opening briefs, ordinarily we 
would not reach the issue. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 
182 (3d Cir. 1993). But we asked for supplemental briefing on 
Packingham’s import here. And, because we are remanding, 
we think it appropriate to offer guidance on how Packingham 
informs the shaping of supervised-release conditions. 
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The District Court can limit Holena’s First Amendment 
rights with appropriately tailored conditions of supervised re-
lease. Defendants on supervised release enjoy less freedom 
than those who have finished serving their sentences. See 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001); United 
States v. Rock, 863 F.3d 827, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2017). But, as we 
have noted, these restrictions must be tailored to deterring 
crime, protecting the public, or rehabilitating the defendant. 
Under Packingham, blanket internet restrictions will rarely be 
tailored enough to pass constitutional muster.  
Here, even under Packingham’s narrower concurrence, the 
bans fail. They suffer from the same “fatal problem” as North 
Carolina’s restriction on using social media. Packingham, 137 
S. Ct. at 1741 (Alito, J., concurring). Their “wide sweep pre-
cludes access to a large number of websites that are most un-
likely to facilitate the commission of a sex crime against a 
child.” Id. So on remand, the District Court must also take care 
not to restrict Holena’s First Amendment rights more than rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate to protect the public. 
D. The sentence was procedurally reasonable 
Finally, we note briefly that the sentence is procedurally 
reasonable because it is consistent with United States v. Booker 
and its progeny. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The District Court cor-
rectly calculated the applicable Guidelines range. It allowed 
the parties to argue for whatever sentence they deemed appro-
priate. It considered all of the § 3553(a) factors. And it suffi-
ciently explained its reasoning on the record. See Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-51 (2007); see also United States v. 
Douglas, 885 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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* * * * * 
Holena poses a danger to children, so the District Court 
may, and should, limit his liberty accordingly. But his super-
vised release must still be tailored to the danger that he poses. 
Holena’s current conditions fail that test. They contradict one 
another. They also sweep too broadly, preventing him from 
reading the news or shopping online. And they limit his First 
Amendment freedoms beyond what is reasonably necessary or 
appropriate. We do not see how they are reasonably tailored to 
further the goals of supervised release, especially protecting 
the public. So we will vacate his sentence and remand for a 
new revocation hearing. 
